避難之島：1948年《經濟學人》文章一則

避難之島？

[特派員訊]

有種討論已存在了一段時間，是關於若蔣介石總統與其政府無法在大陸中國持續對抗共產黨，那麼將往福爾摩沙島撤退。籌備福爾摩沙做為基地的措施似乎已經在執行當中，報告也顯示高級官員們已將自己的家人送往該地。在中國歷史上，已有將福爾摩沙當成最後立足點的先例，當中國在十七世紀受滿洲侵略，使本土陷於其北方征服者後，落敗的明朝支持者便在台灣據守了二十年。由於滿洲人最後還是取得台灣，因此這一先例並不怎麼令人放心，而且防守一方在當時必須完全依賴本地資源，無從期望跨海援助。

在大陸軍事崩潰後維持維持反共政權於福爾摩沙的這種期望，應當是基於以下事實：即福爾摩沙為海島，且無法在缺乏海運與海軍掩護的之下入侵。中國海軍雖然不怎麼樣，但據推測將會繼續效忠政府，同時美國海軍考量到福爾摩沙對美國的戰略重要性，將會提供抵禦共產黨入侵的保護；至於若是這兩個條件都沒有成立，福爾摩沙並不會比中國其他地方更容易防守。福爾摩沙對美國海軍部而言有著重要利益，這很明顯是出於其地理位置，即日本到菲律賓之間的亞洲沿岸島鏈；更有甚者，該地早已具備由日本為防禦而建立的飛行場，同時，附近澎湖群島的馬公港，先前也是日本最重要的海軍基地之一，是面向菲律賓的南端前哨。如果美國在共產黨佔領南京之後，還繼續承認位於福爾摩沙的中國政府，那麼就需要對其提供海軍支援，進而避免該島落入反美勢力的手中。另一方面，如果華盛頓決定承認一個由共產黨所支配的南京聯合政府，那麼位於福爾摩沙的任何分離政權，將在國際法上成為反叛政權，此時美國將排除對其支持；如此一來共產黨將可能佔有福爾摩沙，接著，如果中國與俄羅斯結盟，那麼將可能提供成為蘇維埃空中武力的戰時前進基地。

除了海事防禦，對於一個位在福爾摩沙的難民政府而言，經濟上的生存能力也會是個議題。這方面的前景較為可期，即便缺乏美國援助或政府撤出南京上海時所帶上的金條與美元儲備也無妨。儘管當1945年回歸中國後，初期曾受忽視與失當管理，如今當地仍然成為中國的主要對外貿易資產來源之一。此處並不特別富藏自然資源，但其工業與農業潛力已經由日本人有效開發。對外國的出口價額，如今大約佔全中國出口的十分之一，在輸出的量額方面也只低於上海的出口。價額隨月份變動，主要依賴於糖產的出口量；本年度數字預估總計可超過21百萬美元。比較福爾摩沙近期的外貿數字，或許能夠衡量該島對中國的用處，其中本年度的前兩季分別達到有2,177,800美元與1,957,800美元。本年度前六個月對中國本土的貿易，則顯示出超達13.5百萬台幣。

以價額計算，福爾摩沙有超過四分之三的對外國出口屬於糖產，其次的重要出口品則有茶、水泥、鳳梨與酒精（糖的副產品）。在日本治下共有42座糖廠從事生產，高峰時期每年可以產出1,400,000噸的砂糖。戰爭結束時，完整的糖廠只剩八座，剩下的則在空襲中損毀，或者出於忽視而任其破敗失修。再者，甘蔗的生產也是大幅下降，這主要是因為缺乏肥料。1946年間所生產的糖只達30,000噸，在1947年則有100,000噸。今年的目標是268,000噸，1950年的目標為800,000噸。

雖然沒有被記載在當前的出口清單中，不過福爾摩沙第二重要的農作物是米。透過灌溉與肥料的使用，日本人相當密集地開發了稻米的耕種，這是他們使日本帝國達到糧食自給的行動中的一部份。在戰爭前的高峰年度（1938年），福爾摩沙生產有48,711,452蒲式耳（bushel）的米，其中將近一半銷往日本。幾乎所有可耕土地都已經在從事耕作，但日本人還是希望能夠藉著更科學的方式來持續增進產量。福爾摩沙的作物產出雖然已經比中國絕大多數地方高得多，但仍然遠低於日本。1946年與1947年的總產量分別計有30,977,814蒲式耳與38,930,032蒲式耳，而今年則估計可達42,878,000蒲式耳。合法出口的量很少，相當可觀的數量是被走私到大陸去。

提高甘蔗與稻米生產的主要限制因素在於肥料的短缺。1938年間，福爾摩沙使用了650,675噸的商品化肥料，其中包含了217,300噸的豆餅（soya-bean cake）。至於當局在去年所能得到的，則只有80,000噸的進口化學肥料、40,000噸的豆餅，以及20,000噸的本地產肥料。截至今年八月底，進口的化學肥料只有44,000噸。福爾摩沙經濟原本高度整合於日本經濟之中。雖然福爾摩沙在經濟上與戰前日本相比較為落後，但在農業與工業方面都還是比中國先進。肥料的短缺，清楚地呈現出當某個經濟體系的一部份被撕開並接往他處時，所帶來的難以避免的脫節。據可靠報導，福爾摩沙的肥料需求，今後將要依靠美國的援助計劃。

大多數日本人的大型工業設施，現在都由省政府與中央政府的資源委員會（National Resources Commission）所共同持有，並且由後者經營。經營方面受到美國顧問的協助，同時，尤其在糖業方面，也有一部分日本專家的協助。（僅存留在島上的日本人，除此則只有一些福爾摩沙男人的妻子，以及在臺北的大學裡約莫30名的日本教授與講師）有三家企業是由資源委員會單獨持有並經營：包括戰時供給日本海軍燃料，且被美國轟炸機嚴重擊損的高雄煉油廠，以及基隆附近的金銅礦場（如今產量只有每月1,500盎司黃金與100噸銅），還有高雄的製鋁工廠。這座製鋁廠是島上最精良的工業設施，計劃的生產量是每年20,000噸的未加工鋁錠，不過在日本時代都還未超出12,000噸的產量。美國的空襲使其嚴重受損。復原工作仍然進行當中，當前每年的生產量約有3,000噸。電力短缺是主要的限制因素之一。按照日本人的估計，每生產12,000噸需要42,000千瓦，生產20,000噸則需要60,000千瓦。如今只有16,000千瓦可用。

[BY A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT]

FOR some time there has been talk of President Chiang Kai-shek and his Government withdrawing to the island of Formosa if they are unable to continue resistance to the Communists in continental China. Steps indeed appear to have been taken to prepare Formosa as a base, and high government officials are reported to have been sending their families there. There is precedent in Chinese history for a last stand in Formosa, for, when the Manchus overran China in the seventeenth century, the supporters of the defeated Ming dynasty held out in Formosa for two decades after the mainland had fallen to the conquerors from the north. The precedent is not altogether a reassuring one, for the Manchus got Formosa in the end, but then the defenders had to rely entirely on their own local resources and could not expect aid from across the ocean.

The hope of preserving an anti-Communist regime in Formosa, even after a military collapse on the mainland, is, of course, based on the fact that Formosa is an island, and cannot be invaded without shipping and naval cover. It is assumed that either the Chinese navy, such as it is, will remain loyal to the Government, or else that the American navy, on account of the strategic important of Formosa to the United States, would provide protection and bar a Communist invasion; if nether of these conditions were to be fulfilled, Formosa would be no easier to defend than any other part of China. That Formosa is of great interest to the United States Navy Department is apparent from its geographical position in the island chain fringing Asia, from Japan to the Philippines; moreover, it is already well provided with airfields which were constructed for its defence by the Japanese and the neighbouring harbour of Makung in the Pescadores islands was formerly one of the most important Japanese naval bases, their farthest south outpost towards the Philippines. If the United States were to continue to recognize a Chinese government in Formosa as legal in spite of a Communist occupation of Nanking, it would be in order to support it with naval assistance and thus keep the island from falling into the hands of an anti-American power. If, on the other hand, Washington were to decide to recognise a Communist-dominated coalition government in Nanking any separate regime in Formosa would be, in international law, a rebel authority and the Americans would be precluded from supporting it; the Communists then might get hold of Formosa and if China were to make an alliance with Russia, it would be available as an advance base for Soviet air power in time of war.

Apart from the question of naval protection, there would be the problem of economic viability for a refugee government in Formosa. In this respect the situation would be more promising, even without American aid or the bullion and American dollar reserves which the Government would presumably be able to bring with it from the evacuation of Nanking and Shanghai. In spite of initial neglect and mismanagement after its restoration to China in 1945, it is today one of China’s principal assets for foreign trade. It is not particularly well endowed with natural resources, but both its industrial and its agricultural potentialities had been efficiently exploited by the Japanese. The value of its exports to foreign countries is today approximately on tenth of the value of all China’s exports, and their volume is exceeded only by the exports being shipped out of Shanghai. The value varies from month to month, depending chiefly on the amount of sugar exported; but the total figure for this year is expected to exceed US$21 million. The island’s usefulness to China may be gauged by comparing this last figure with Formosa’s allocations of foreign exchange, which for the first two quarters of this year amounted to US$2,177,800 and US$1,957,800 respectively. Trade with the mainland for the first six months of this year showed an excess of exports over imports of Taiwan $13.5 million.

In terms of value, more than three-quarters of Formosa’s exports to foreign countries consists of sugar, the next most important exports being tea, cement, pineapples and alcohol (a by-product of sugar). Under the Japanese there were 42 sugar mills producing, at their peak, 1,400,000 tons of sugar a year. Only eight mills were discovered intact at the end of the war, the rest having been damaged in bombing raids or allowed to fall into disrepair through neglect. Moreover, the production of sugarcane had dropped sharply, chiefly through lack of fertilisers. Only 30,000 tons of sugar were produced in 1946 and 100,000 tons in 1947. The target for this year 268,000 tons and for 1950 800,000 tons.

Prospects for Rice

Although it does not figure in the current list of exports the next most important crop in Formosa is rice. The Japanese developed rice cultivation intensively, through irrigation and the use of fertilisers, as part of their campaign to make the Japanese empire self-sufficient in food. In the peak year before the war (1938) Formosa produced 48,711,452 bushels of rice, of which nearly half was exported to Japan. Nearly all cultivable land was under cultivation but the Japanese hoped to be able to increase production still further by more scientific methods. Although much higher than in most parts of China the Formosan crop yields were well below those in Japan. Production for 1946 and 1947 totalled 30,977,814 bushels and 38,930,032 bushels respectively, and the estimate for this year is 42,878,000 bushels. Little has been exported legitimately but there has been a considerable amount of smuggling across to the mainland.

In raising the production of suger-cane and rice the chief limiting factor in both cases is the shortage of fertiliser. In 1938 Formosa used 650,675 tons of commercial fertiliser, including 217,300 tons of soya-bean cake. Last year the authorities were able to obtain only 80,000 tons of imported chemical fertiliser, 40,000 tons of bean cake and 20,000 tons of locally manufactured fertiliser. Up to the end of August this year only 44,000 tons of chemical fertiliser had been imported. Formosa’s economy was thoroughly integrated with Japan’s. Although backward economically compared with prewar Japan, Formosa is advanced both agriculturally and industrially compared with China. This shortage of fertiliser illustrates clearly the inevitable dislocation which occurs when an area is torn from one economic system, of which it forms an integral part, and attached to another. It is reliably reported that Formosa’s fertiliser requirements are henceforth going to be covered by the American aid programme.

Most of the big Japanese industrial installation are now owned jointly by the Provincial Government and the National Resources Commission of the central government, being operated by the latter. The managements are being assisted by some American advisers and especially in the sugar field, by some Japanese experts. (The only other Japanese left on the island, apart from some Japanese wives of Formosan men, are about 30 Japanese professors and lecturers at the university in Taipeh.) Three enterprises are owned and operated by the National Resources Commission alone:—-the oil refineries at Kaohsiung which fuelled the Japanese navy during the war and were badly damaged by American bombers, the gold and copper mines near Keelung (currently producing only 1,500 ozs. of gold and 100 tons of copper monthly), and the aluminium works at Kaohsiung. This aluminium plant, the most elaborate single industrial installation on the island, was planned to produce 20,000 tons of unfinished aluminium ingots a year, but under the Japanese it never got beyond the stage of producing 12,000 tons. It was severely damaged by American bombing raids. Rehabilitation is still in progress and it is currently producing about 3,000 tons a year. One of the main limiting factor is shortage of electric power. The Japanese estimated that they required 42,000 Kws. to produce 12,000 tons and 60,000 Kws. to produce 20,000 tons. At present only 16,000 Kws are available.